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Abstract
This paper shows how the distribution of the ownership of multinational
companies and the labour market conditions, especially the wage formation
process, influence the outcome of interjurisdictional tax competition and
coordination. In particular, it sets forth that equilibrium corporate tax rate can
be negative, being a subsidy to the mobile factor, financed through a tax on
the immobile one, and that foreign ownership of companies enables a
jurisdiction which behaves non-cooperatively to export its tax burden through
a too large tax rate on profits on its territory.
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For the last twenty years, a huge amount of research has been conducted
on interjurisdictional tax competition in general and international tax com-
petition for capital in particular. Let us mention the pioneering work of
Gordon (1983, 1986, 1992) or Razin and Sadka (1991) as well as the funda-
mental discussion proposed by Edwards and Keen (1996) and the state of
the art, including the distributive aspects, of Cremer et al. (1996), Oates
(1999), Wellisch (2000), Wildasin (1998) or Wilson (1999), all mentioned by
Wildasin (2000).
The present paper, which extends previous work, a.o. with M. Hadhri -
see Gérard and Hadhri (1993, 1994), Gérard (2001) -, focuses on the eﬀect
on the outcome of tax competition and coordination, of the labour market
conditions, especially the wage formation process, on the one hand, and of
the distribution of the ownership of a multijurisdictional ﬁrm on the other
hand. By the former it has something in common with recent contributions
of Fuest and Huber (1999, 2001), by the latter with Huizinga and Nielsen
(1997) and Eijﬁnger and Wagner (2001). The results obtained in the paper
are consistent with the standard lessons that the corporate income tax rate
levied at source should vanish under tax competition and that such a frame-
work leads to tax rates on the mobile factor income which are too small as
compared with those which would appear at social optimum. However those
standard lessons appear to be only speciﬁc cases generated by a model which
can also produce less standard results like a negative tax rate on the income
of the mobile factor, and too large tax rates on that factor at non-cooperative
equilibrium. The argument beyond that is developed thereafter but is basi-
cally the following one : taking into account another source of tax revenue,
deemed to be immobile and inelastically supplied, allows the jurisdiction to
tax that captive tax base in order to ﬁnance public goods and to subsidise
the mobile factor ; otherwise an increase in the foreign ownership of the tax
base is an opportunity for the jurisdiction to export the burden of the tax on
the mobile factor income, and thus to increase the corresponding tax rate.
The ﬁrst argument in particular is consistent with the empirical observation
that eﬀective tax rates - see King and Fullerton (1984), Gérard (1993) - can
be negative and that many public authorities use to subsidise investment on
their territory in order to increase the welfare of the residents.
Focusing on labour market conditions points out that the process of wage
formation matters. Indeed, as shown in the paper, moving from rigid wage
1rates determined, say, by a bargaining process outside the model, to ﬂexible
market determined wages, implies that a given tax cut will have a smaller
eﬀect in terms of both the value of the ﬁrm and the level of tax revenue ;
indeed, when wage rates are variable, the tax cut can generate extra pressure
on the labour market, and then higher wage rates and labour costs, which in
turn push the proﬁt and the tax base downward.
Let us add that the degree of domestic ownership of the multijurisdic-
tional ﬁrm can be interpreted either as the degree actually observed in the
jurisdiction, which is the point of view adopted in this paper, or, alterna-
tively, as the concern of the tax designer of the jurisdiction for the holders of
capital assets, a viewpoint set forth in Gérard (2001).
As shown in the paper the interaction between labour market conditions
and the distribution of ownership of the multijurisdictional ﬁrms appears to
a key issue here.
Finally, the corporate tax system at work in this model is a pure source
one, by which is meant that the corporate tax base consists of the proﬁt
produced on the territory by the joint use of capital and labour. This
approach is consistent with both the most frequently tax system applied, at
least in the European Union, to proﬁts of a foreign permanent branch or of a
foreign subsidiary - see article 7 of the OECD model tax convention and the
Parent-Subsidiary EU Directive of July 23, 1990 -. It is also consistent with
the consolidated tax base system recently set forth by the EU Commission
- see EU Commission (2001) - provided that the apportionment criterion be
the proﬁt on the territory ; that criterion does not make a problem in this
paper since there in no intracompany trade.
Section 2 thereafter presents the model, successively reviewing the behav-
iour of the multijurisdictional ﬁrm, the condition of the labour market, the
capital income of the residents and the programme of the governments. Then
we turn ﬁrst to the interjurisdictional social equilibrium and, second, to the
non-cooperative equilibrium. Some conclusions and avenues are suggested
in section 5.
The model used here is kept as simple as possible in order to help focus
on the mechanisms we want to set forth. In particular private and public
consumptions are regarded as perfect substitutes. In line with that assump-
tion, the precise determination of the tax rate on labour income is left aside
; however it plays a key role, its base determining the lower limit of the
corporate tax rate, and thus the highest level of the subsidy.
22T h e m o d e l
This section presents the model, dealing successively with the behaviour of
the multijurisdictional ﬁrm, the conditions of the labour market, the capital
income of the residents and the programme of the government.
2.1 Behaviour of the multijurisdictional ﬁrm
Let us consider a multijurisdictional ﬁrm which has to allocate one unit of
investment between two jurisdictions h and f in such a way that its value
is maximised. The ﬁrm uses two factors, capital, deemed to be mobile -
not necessarily perfectly mobile - across jurisdictions, and labour assumed
to be immobile and inelastically supplied, to produce goods which are sold





(1 − τh)Tf (αh,l h)+( 1− τf)Tf (αf,l f)
ρ
(1)
assuming that the horizon of time is inﬁnite and the various parameters
invariant over time. In that equation αh is the fraction of the capital invested
in jurisdiction h - the home jurisdiction - and αf =1− αh its counterpart
in jurisdiction f, the foreign jurisdiction. Moreover τh and τf denote the
corporate tax rates and Th and Tf the corresponding tax bases and thus the
before tax proﬁts obtained in each jurisdiction ; lh and lf are the levels of
employment provided by the ﬁrm, and ρ stands for the discounting rate ;
however, without loss of generality we can assume ρ =1 .
The tax bases functions are of the form,
Tj (αj,l f)=f (αj,l j) − wjlj , j = h,f (2)
and are assumed to be quasi concave since production functions f (αj,l j) are















− wj =0 (4)



























0 6= j (6)
The second order conditions are proved in Appendix A while the signs of the
partial derivatives of the demand functions come from the standard compar-
ative statics exercise presented in Appendix 2.





2.2 Domestic labour income and wage formation
We assume that labour is not mobile across jurisdictions and is inelastically
supplied in each jurisdiction. Then two polar situations are supposed to be
possible in each jurisdiction : either the wage rate wj clears a labour market
always characterized by full employment or it does not and unemployment is
present. In that latter case one can imagine that the wage rate obeys a game
between the employers and the employees or their representatives, which is
conducted outside the model. In that latter case too the investment of the
multijurisdictional ﬁrm creates additional jobs in the jurisdiction, reducing
unemployment, without making any upward pressure on the wage rate. Un-
like that, in the former situation, the arrival of the multijurisdictional ﬁrm
- and more precisely of multijurisdictional ﬁrms since the one we consider is
a representative of a series - crowds out existing jobs and pushes the wage
rate up ; that latter phenomenon is not anticipated by the multijurisdictional
ﬁrm since, individually, it is price taker.
Thus gross labour income yj = wjLj is increased by the arrival of the
multijurisdictional ﬁrm either since Lj increases or since wj goes up. How-












4with 0 ≤ kj ≤ 1.
Finally, net labour income is (1 − tj)yj.
2.3 Capital income of the residents
The residents of the jurisdiction are deemed to hold a fraction θj of the shares
of the multijurisdictional ﬁrm. Their gross capital income is thus θjV .
Let us add that the fact that the multijurisdictional ﬁrm has to allocate its
investment between jurisdictions h and f does not preclude that its ownership
is more disseminated in the world ; therefore we don’t require that the sum
of θh and θf equals unity but we simply assume that if θh goes up, then θf
goes down.
2.4 The governments
The government of jurisdiction j is interested in maximising the welfare of
the residents of that jurisdiction identiﬁed with the sum of their private
and public consumptions, with private and public consumption respectively
deﬁned by,
cj =( 1− tj)yj + θjV (8)
and
gj = tjyj + τjTj (9)
so that the welfare of the jurisdiction is
Wj = yj + θjV + τjTj (10)
to be maximised subject to the budget constraint
tjyj + τjTj ≥ gj (11)
At this stage it is worth noticing that in this model, one euro used to
ﬁnance private consumption is equally valued as one euro ﬁnancing public
expenditures. Otherwise the allocation of the residents’ income between
public and private uses is left aside in the model. Accordingly the tax levied
on immobile income can be used both to ﬁnance public expenditures and
to allow the corporate tax rate to be changed into a subsidy to the mobile
5factor, which in turn increases both gross labour income and capital income
of the residents.
Therefore the maximisation process can be conducted as if there is only
one tax instrument.
3 The interjurisdictional game
Prior to considering the interjurisdictional non-cooperative game, we examine
the outcome of the model should a benevolent social planner be at work
at interjurisdictional level. That approach provides us with a cooperative
solution, or tax coordination outcome, which can be used as a benchmark
for comparing non-cooperative solutions.
3.1 An interjurisdictional social equilibrium
The social planner maximises Wh + Wf with respect to the available instru-
ments, actually w.r.t. τf and τh,
max
τh,τf
(Wh + Wf) (12)


















































However, by the ﬁrst order conditions of the value maximization of the






















































and similarly again for the condition w.r.t. τf.


































the elements of the f.o.c. which correspond to the best interest of jurisdiction


































which corresponds to the internalisation of the eﬀect on the other jurisdiction.
In that latter expression it is a key issue to point out the term −θfTh. Indeed
that term, which illustrates the fraction of the tax base on the territory of
jurisdiction h which is attributed, or ”exported”, to residents of jurisdiction
f, is negative while its absolute value is decreasing in τh. It turns out that
there is no guarantee that Xh (τh,τf) > 0. U n l i k et h a ti tm a yb e ,a tl e a s t
for relatively high values of θf that Xh (τh,τf) < 0 so that internalising the
eﬀect of τh on the welfare of the residents of jurisdiction f can lead to a
smaller equilibrium value of that tax parameter.
For an immediate insight, consider the peculiar case where there is only
one factor, capital ; then








8Let us add that the outcome of that maximization is subject to the con-
dition that








, tj =1 (21)
where tj stands for the upper limit for tj. T h a tl a s to b s e r v a t i o ns h o w s
the importance of the size of a jurisdiction, a point put forward by Hauﬂer
and Wooton (1999). Moreover, notice that in this equilibrium there is no
interjurisdictional government transfer from one jurisdiction to another.
3.2 Non-cooperative game and Nash equilibrium
Let us now examine the outcome of the interjurisdictional game if govern-
ments decide to play non-cooperatively, thus engaging in a process of tax
competition.
Consider the behavior of government h. Maximization of Wh implies τh
such that,
Dh (τh,τf)=0 (22)






























labour income eﬀect The ﬁr s tl i n eo ft h er i g h th a n ds i d eo ft h ee q u a -
tion gives the eﬀect of a change in the corporate tax rate on labour income,
either through a change in the amount of employed people or in the level of












9capital income eﬀect The second line provides us with the eﬀect of
a change in the domestic corporate tax rate on the income or the wealth of
the domestic shareholders of the multijurisdictional ﬁrm. That expression
depends in a key manner on the size of the domestic ownership of the ﬁrm
measured by parameter θh, and on the conditions of the labour market at
home and abroad. In particular, if the wage rate is ﬂexible in both jurisdic-
tions, a tax cut in jurisdiction h (i) will reduce the tax liabilities given the
value of tax base Th in the jurisdiction, (ii) but also will reduce the gross
proﬁt in that jurisdiction - or will limit its increase - since the tax cut, by
making location in that jurisdiction more attractive, induces pressures on
the local labour market which in turn push the wage cost up and, ﬁnally,
(iii) will increase the gross proﬁt in the other jurisdiction - or will limit its
decline - since the considered tax cut, by pushing away investment from the
other jurisdiction, will relax pressures on that jurisdiction’s labour market,
pushing down the labour cost, in that jurisdiction.
government budget eﬀect Finally, the third line shows the eﬀect
of the tax change on the level of government revenue. It consists in a
direct eﬀect Th - a tax cut decreases tax revenue given the tax base - and
a strategic or tax base eﬀect - on the one hand, by making the jurisdiction
more attractive, a tax cut expands the tax base on the territory, but, on
the other hand, resulting increased unit labour cost, if salaries are ﬂexible,
pushes down that tax base since wage cost is deductible against the corporate
tax base -.
The second order condition of the maximisation w.r.t. τh requires that
Dhh (τh,τf) < 0 (25)
Assuming, in order to keep the model as tractable as possible, that y, w,












































which is negative. Notice that we can justify that the expression between
brackets is negative by using an incentive compatibility argument.
Now let us inspect some particular cases, before showing the results from
a comparative statics exercise and turning to the derivation of the reaction
functions and the discussion of the Nash equilibrium.
3.2.1 Some particular cases
Suppose ﬁrst that there is only one factor, capital, and that the residents
of the jurisdiction own no fraction of the multijurisdictional ﬁrm, or, equiv-
alently, that the government of the jurisdiction has no concern for capital
income. Then we will introduce labour, ﬁrst assuming that wages are ﬁxed,
then allowing them to vary in line with supply and demand on the labour
market.
A single factor, capital Leaving labour aside, the ﬁrst order condition
(22) turns out to be















Especially, if the residents of the jurisdiction own no fraction of the multi-




















the interpretation of which is in line with Ramsey (1927) rule, ηh being the
elasticity of the tax base w.r.t. αh. That equation also shows that the











which characterises perfect capital mobility, then τf =0 .
If there is some ownership of the multijurisdictional ﬁrm by resident tax-
payers or if the government has concern for that ownership, then the equi-





































and we immediately see that the tax rate on income of the mobile factor
levied at source increases with the fraction of that rate which is supported
by non resident taxpayers.
12two factors, labour and capital Introducing labour, and ﬁrst assuming


































so that the equilibrium tax rate on corporate income is still lower, in order
to take into account the positive impact of a tax cut on labour income.
Moreover we can no longer exclude that it becomes negative ; therefore we
actually have that τf is equal to the maximum of the value provided by
equation (32) and the one given by equation (21).
Consider especially the case of perfect mobility of capital, then the ﬁrst
element of the right hand side of equation (32) vanishes while, using the












































so that the numerator of the fraction is larger while the denominator is
smaller. As a consequence, the tax rate is larger. The economic argument
behind that is that under wage ﬂexibility, a tax cut pushes the wage cost
upward reducing the return of the tax cut both for the ﬁrm, in terms of proﬁt,
and for the government, in terms of tax base ; therefore the government is
restrained from reducing the tax rate. However now the labour conditions
in the other jurisdiction also matter since, if the wage rate is ﬂexible in the
other jurisdiction, the tax cut in the home jurisdiction will push the wage
rate downward in the foreign jurisdiction as a response of that latter labour
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Table 1: equilibrium values of the corporate tax rate
market to the shift in investment ; that phenomenon will push the home
jurisdiction to reduce its corporate tax rate, and that incentive will increase
with the domestic ownership of the multijurisdictional ﬁrm.
To have some additional insight consider the case θh =0 .T h e n , t h e
eﬀect of the ﬂexibility of wages is to push the corporate tax rate upward














Table 1 summarises that discussion,
3.2.2 Comparative statics











14since Dhh < 0 by the second order conditions of the maximization of the res-
idents’ social welfare by the government. Therefore we observe the following
results.
Variation of the domestic ownership of the multijurisdictional
ﬁrm An increase in the domestic ownership of the multijurisdictional ﬁrm





Th +( 1− τh)(1− kh)lh
∂wh
∂τh






In other words, when the fraction of the corporate tax supported by the
residents increases, the desired level of that tax decreases.
Variation of the domestic labour market conditions The eﬀect
of increased rigidity regarding the formation of the wage rate on the do-
mestic labour market depends on the distribution of the ownership of the
multijurisdictional ﬁrm.






















ﬁrst shows that if no fraction of the multijurisdictional ﬁrm is owned by
resident taxpayers - θh =0-, then the sign of the eﬀect of increased rigidity
will depend on the balance between the gain in terms of jobs and the losses
in terms of wages, on the one hand, and the gain in terms of tax revenue
from less tax base reduction on the other hand. Suppose ﬁr s tt h a tt h e
level of employment in the multijurisdictional sector is large relative to the
one in the purely domestic sector, then the ﬁrst term in the ﬁrst bracket
of the right hand side of the equation dominates the second one and the
sign is negative : increased rigidity is an incentive for the government to cut
corporate tax in order to get extra jobs. Unlike that, if the multijurisdictional
sector is small, e.g. in a large jurisdiction with an important domestic sector,
the second term of the ﬁrst bracket dominates the ﬁrst one and the sign is
positive : an increased rigidity in the wage formation process is an incentive
for the government to refrain from pushing the tax rate downward ; indeed
increased rigidity prevents the labour community as a whole beneﬁting from
15the increased wage rate generated by a multijurisdictional ﬁrms’ attractive
corporate tax cut.
Now, when a positive fraction of the multijurisdictional ﬁrm is owned by
resident taxpayers, increased rigidity is also regarded by resident shareholders
as a situation which makes increased labour cost less likely and thus increases
the proﬁtability of the ﬁrm ; then the jurisdiction is more likely to call for a
further tax cut when rigidity increases.
Thus the sign of the eﬀect is more likely to be negative when domestic
ownership of the multijurisdictional ﬁrm is large and when the multijurisdic-
tional sector is also large as compared to the purely domestic one.
Variation of the foreign labour market conditions Finally, in-
creased rigidity in the wage formation process in the other jurisdiction re-
duces the gain for the shareholders of the multijurisdictional ﬁrm, from a tax
cut in the domestic jurisdiction ; indeed that tax cut is then less likely to
generate a downward movement in the wage rate abroad. Being less prof-
itable for the multijurisdictional ﬁrm domestic holders, the tax cut will be
less important as long as the interest of those multijurisdictional ﬁrm domes-











3.2.3 The reaction functions and the Nash equilibrium
Using equation (35), the response of jurisdiction h in terms of its corporate






























Symmetric result appears for the other jurisdiction.



















which, under the assumption of linearisation already issued, and the further



























which is likely to hold. Examples of suﬃcient conditions aret kf =1 , θh =0
or (1 − kh)lh =( 1− kf)lf.
Let us consider still another case for illustrative purposes, the one where







Moreover, from equation (32),w ec a nw r i t en o wt h a t
τh =
(1 − θh)aτf − b
(2 − θh)a
(44)








∂τf > 0 and b =
∂yh
∂τh > 0,a n ds i m i l a r l yt h a t
τf =
(1 − θf)aτh − b
(2 − θf)a
Then, at Nash equilibrium,




a negative value independent of the distribution of the ownership ; that
equilibrium is stable since a>0.


















so that the eﬀect of a change in, say θh, can now be decomposed into a direct
eﬀect and a strategic one. Since both |E| and
∂τh
∂τf are positive - assuming the
17equilibrium is stable - the strategic eﬀect reinforces the direct one ; the direct
one itself however is larger than in a closed economy - the case investigated
previously - since 0 < |E| < 1.
Moreover we can complete the comparative statics conducted before,





















Tf +( 1− τf)(1− kf)lf
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Taken separately, an increase in the ownership of the multijurisdictional ﬁrm
by residents of the competing jurisdiction pushes the corporate tax rate down-
ward in the home jurisdiction : residents of the foreign jurisdiction indeed
ask for a reduced tax rate in their own jurisdiction and residents of the home
jurisdiction react by asking a further reduction of the tax rate on their ter-
ritory.
However if we combine a reduction in the domestic ownership with an






















The decrease in domestic ownership pushes the tax rate upward directly
and indirectly since the strategic complementarity reinforces the eﬀect, while
the corresponding increase in the foreign ownership pushes the foreign tax
rate downward and the domestic rate too so that, assuming that the two
strategic eﬀects cancel, the outcome of the shift in the ownership to the
other jurisdiction is an increase in the domestic corporate tax rate.
4C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has shown that the outcome of tax competition, and then of tax
coordination, depends in a key manner on both labour market conditions,
especially the wage formation process, and the distribution of ﬁrm ownership.
18The paper is consistent with traditional lessons of tax competition models
that the tax rate on mobile factor income tends to vanish and that tax
competition turns out to produce too low tax rate on that income ; however
it shows that those are particular cases of a model which can also produce less
standard results, especially that equilibrium value of the corporate income
tax rate can be negative, thus turned out to be a subsidy, and that non-
cooperative mobile factor income tax rate can be too large.
In particular, the following observations have been set forth.
First, providing extra job opportunities, or higher pay, to domestic work-
ers is per se an incentive to reduce the corporate tax rate which can even
become negative. In that latter case, multijurisdictional ﬁrm investment is
subsidised by means of money levied on wage income through a labour in-
come tax. The revenue of that latter levy and then the level of the subsidy
is obviously determined by the size of the labour income tax base, and thus
b yt h es i z eo ft h ej u r i s d i c t i o n .
Second, entering into tax competition when domestic underemployment
is high can lead to a larger cut in the corporate tax rate than when full
employment is at work, especially if the best interest of the domestic holders
of the multijurisdictional ﬁrm capital is taken into account. Indeed, when
underemployment prevails, there is no risk that the investment leads the
multijurisdictional ﬁrm to pay a higher wage rate in order to be able to hire
workers.
Third, for symmetric reason engaging into tax competition with a foreign
jurisdiction experimenting underemployment refrains a jurisdiction from re-
ducing its own corporate tax rate, again when the best interest of the do-
mestic holders of the multijurisdictional ﬁrm capital is taken into account
: indeed those stockholders are less interested in moving capital away from
abroad since there is no gain in terms of reduced wage cost in that latter
jurisdiction.
Those latter two observations show that the eﬀect of the labour market
conditions, at home and abroad, depends in a key manner on the distribution
of the multijurisdictional ﬁrm ownership and thus on the concern of the
governement for capital holders.
Fourth, entering into tax competition with a jurisdiction of large multi-
jurisdictional ﬁrm ownership leads to a higher domestic corporate tax rate,
part on the tax burden being exported.
Finally it appears that substituting ﬁscal cooperation, or coordination,
for tax competition, can lead to a larger or a smaller equilibrium tax rate
19depending on both the labour market conditions and the the importance of
multijurisdictional ﬁrm ownership in the partner jurisdiction : if the partner
jurisdiction has a high ownership, we cannot rule out that the cooperatively
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22Appendix 1. Second order conditions of the
maximization of the Value of the ﬁrm
























(αh,l h) < 0
satisﬁed by the concavity of the production functions.







































In the ﬁrst matrix, the main diagonal elements are negative so that their








so that the determinant is positive if the production functions have the good
shape. In the second matrix, the main diagonal elements are also both




=0, j 6= j
0
and again the determinant is positive.





























































































The ﬁrst term of that expression is clearly negative ; in the second term
the ﬁrst two elements are negative and the last one is positive so that the
term itself is positive ; in the last term the ﬁrst element is positive and the
other two are negative so that the term is positive. As a consequence the
determinant is negative.
Appendix 2. Comparative statics at ﬁrm level
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25dτh dτf dwh dwf
dαh − + − +
dαf + − + −
dlh − + − +
dlf + − + −
















































































































with |D| < 0 by equation (49).
It turns out that the signs of the comparative statics are those given by
Table 2.
26